


# Cybersecurity Technology for Critical Power Infrastructure AI-Based Centralized Defense and Edge Resilience


## Quarterly Review Workshop IV



## Task 7 Malware Threat Mitigation

Dr. Wenke Lee, Moses Ike  
Georgia Institute of Technology  
March 21, 2023


# Detecting Malware Code Execution in SCADA Hosts



- SCADA is the **critical-path** for a cyber attacker to disrupt/damage the physical side
- Majority of **in-the-Wild** ICS malware were launched from the SCADA hosts systems

Task 7 Integration Collaborators

# SCADA Host Execution vs. Network Traffic Analysis



Process Monitor - C:\Users\tingwei\Desktop\ProcessMonitor\compare\_read\_write\_automatic.PML


Time of Day	Process Name	Operation	Path
11:58:00.6185077 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:58:00.6426596 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:58:10.6137832 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:58:10.6428279 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:58:20.6135878 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:58:20.6436740 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:58:30.6150225 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:58:30.6440060 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:58:30.7325448 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:58:30.7487234 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:58:40.6136909 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:58:40.6446850 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:58:40.7341902 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:58:50.6132060 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:58:50.6455823 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:58:50.6953501 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:59:00.6136827 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:59:00.6456876 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::
11:59:10.6131961 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d::

automatic.pcapng

Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
192.168.204.133	192.168.204.136	Modbus...	66	Query: Trans: 5; Unit: 1, Func: 1: Read Coils
192.168.204.136	192.168.204.133	Modbus...	64	Response: Trans: 5; Unit: 1, Func: 1: Read Coils
192.168.204.133	192.168.204.136	TCP	60	1073 → 502 [ACK] Seq=73 Ack=61 Win=65640 Len=0
192.168.204.133	192.168.204.136	Modbus...	66	Query: Trans: 6; Unit: 1, Func: 5: Write Single Coil
192.168.204.136	192.168.204.133	Modbus...	66	Response: Trans: 6; Unit: 1, Func: 5: Write Single Coil
192.168.204.133	192.168.204.136	Modbus...	66	Query: Trans: 7; Unit: 1, Func: 5: Write Single Coil
192.168.204.136	192.168.204.133	Modbus...	66	Response: Trans: 7; Unit: 1, Func: 5: Write Single Coil
192.168.204.133	192.168.204.136	TCP	60	1073 → 502 [ACK] Seq=97 Ack=85 Win=65616 Len=0
192.168.204.133	192.168.204.136	Modbus...	66	Query: Trans: 8; Unit: 1, Func: 2: Read Discrete Inputs
192.168.204.136	192.168.204.133	Modbus...	64	Response: Trans: 8; Unit: 1, Func: 2: Read Discrete Inputs
192.168.204.133	192.168.204.136	Modbus...	66	Query: Trans: 9; Unit: 1, Func: 1: Read Coils
192.168.204.136	192.168.204.133	Modbus...	64	Response: Trans: 9; Unit: 1, Func: 1: Read Coils
192.168.204.133	192.168.204.136	Modbus...	66	Query: Trans: 10; Unit: 1, Func: 5: Write Single Coil
192.168.204.136	192.168.204.133	Modbus...	66	Response: Trans: 10; Unit: 1, Func: 5: Write Single Coil
192.168.204.133	192.168.204.136	TCP	60	1073 → 502 [ACK] Seq=133 Ack=117 Win=65584 Len=0
192.168.204.133	192.168.204.136	Modbus...	66	Query: Trans: 11; Unit: 1, Func: 2: Read Discrete Inputs
192.168.204.136	192.168.204.133	Modbus...	64	Response: Trans: 11; Unit: 1, Func: 2: Read Discrete Inputs
192.168.204.133	192.168.204.136	Modbus...	66	Query: Trans: 12; Unit: 1, Func: 1: Read Coils

Who is issuing observed commands?  
Attacker or legitimate SCADA ?

# Physical-Bound SCADA Host Execution




Process Monitor - C:\Users\tingwei\Desktop\ProcessMonitor\compare\_read\_write\_automatic.PML

Time of Day	Process Name	Operation	Path
11:58:00.6185077 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:58:00.6426596 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:58:10.6137832 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:58:10.6428279 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:58:20.6135878 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:58:20.6436740 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:58:30.6150225 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:58:30.6440060 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:58:30.7325448 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:58:30.7487234 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:58:40.6136909 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:58:40.6446850 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:58:40.7341902 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:58:50.6132060 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:58:50.6455823 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:58:50.6953501 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:59:00.6136827 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:59:00.6456876 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::
11:59:10.6131961 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85:740d::

ScadaBR.exe	CreateFile	C:\Program Files\ScadaBR\tomcat
ScadaBR.exe	QueryDirectory	C:\Program Files\ScadaBR\tomcat\webapps
ScadaBR.exe	CloseFile	C:\Program Files\ScadaBR\tomcat
ScadaBR.exe	CreateFile	C:\Program Files\ScadaBR\tomcat\webapps
ScadaBR.exe	QueryDirectory	C:\Program Files\ScadaBR\tomcat\webapps\Scad
ScadaBR.exe	CloseFile	C:\Program Files\ScadaBR\tomcat\webapps
ScadaBR.exe	CreateFile	C:\Program Files\ScadaBR\tomcat\webapps\Scad
ScadaBR.exe	QueryDirectory	C:\Program Files\ScadaBR\tomcat\webapps\Scad
ScadaBR.exe	CloseFile	C:\Program Files\ScadaBR\tomcat\webapps\Scad
ScadaBR.exe	CreateFile	C:\Program Files\ScadaBR\tomcat\webapps\Scad
ScadaBR.exe	QueryDirectory	C:\Program Files\ScadaBR\tomcat\webapps\Scad
ScadaBR.exe	CloseFile	C:\Program Files\ScadaBR\tomcat\webapps\Scad
ScadaBR.exe	Thread Create	
ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc:85::8d1:4711:80fa:ffff:1088 -> leo-PC:502
ScadaBR.exe	TCP Receive	c0a8:cc:85::8d1:4711:80fa:ffff:1088 -> leo-PC:502
ScadaBR.exe	CreateFile	C:\
ScadaBR.exe	QueryDirectory	C:\Program Files

## Statistical Analysis of Physical-bound Host Execution

# Statistical Analysis of Physical-bound Host Execution



## Frequency and Temporal Properties

### Control Command Dependency

$$P(V_k) := \{C_j, C_{j+1}, \dots, C_n\} \cup \{M_j, M_{j+1}, \dots, M_n\}$$

$$\forall M_i, C_j \in P(V_k) \wedge (ts(M_i) < ts(C_j)) : C_j \leftarrow C_i$$

### 1 Control Time-Interval

$$\forall C_i, C_j \in P(V_k) \text{ s.t. } i \neq j : \Delta(i, j) := ABS(ts(C_i) - ts(C_j))$$

$$R_{D\Delta}(i-1, i) = \frac{Deviation(j) + \epsilon_{(i-1, i)}}{Mean(j)}$$

### 2 Control Burst-Interval

$$(\forall B_{C_i}, B_{P_i} \in P(V_k) : \mu_j := |B_{C_i}| - |B_{P_i}|)$$

$$R_{D\mu}(i) = \frac{Deviation(j) + \lambda_{(i)}}{Mean(j)}$$

### 3 Control Frequency

$$\forall C_i \in P(V_k) \quad F(i) := |C_i|$$

$$R_{DF}(i) = \frac{|C_i \in P(V_k)|}{|P(V_k)|}$$

Time of Day	Process Name	Operation	Path
11:58:00.6185077 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:58:00.6426595 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:58:10.6137832 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:58:10.6428279 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:58:20.6135878 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:58:20.6436740 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:58:30.6150225 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:58:30.6440060 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:58:30.7325448 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:58:30.7487234 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:58:40.6136909 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:58:40.6446850 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:58:40.7341902 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:58:50.6132060 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:58:50.6458823 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:58:50.6353501 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:59:00.6136827 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:59:00.6456876 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:
11:59:10.6131961 AM	ScadaBR.exe	TCP Send	c0a8:cc85:740d:

# Code Release on Github: SCAWATCH

<https://github.com/lordmoses/SCAWATCH>

## Installation Steps

```
1.git clone https://github.com/lordmoses/SCAWATCH.git
2.cd SCAWATCH
3.pip install -r requirements.txt
4.Edit config.json
5.python3 scawatch.py
6.To end things, press CTRL -C
```



- Functionality on this code release
  - Fully automated SCADA execution tracing, capture, storage management, and remote transfer

## Configuration config.json

```
{
  "size_limit" : 50,
  "check_interval" : 5,
  "procmon_location" : "C:/Users/Desktop/Procmon.exe",
  "scada_process" : "ScadaBR.exe",
  "ENABLE_LOCAL_STORAGE": 1,
  "SEND_LOGS_TO_REMOTE_SERVER": 1,
  "remote_server_machine" : "avatar@AVATAR.gatech.edu",
  "remote_server_folder" : "/home/AVATAR",
  "ssh_client_identity_file" : "C:/Users/.ssh/id_rsa",
  "DEBUG_MODE" : 0
}
```

The software process that talks to the PLC. If using **MODBUS**, use **netstat** to check for communication to port **502**


# End-to-End Deployment Scenario (Passive Monitoring and Alerting)



## Review Workshop IV Checklist

- Collaboration
  - RAD and Meptagon
- Commercialization Potential
  - Architecture/algorithm for SCADA host anomaly alerting
- Integration
  - Dr. Sukarno (Task 14 GIT) and Dr. Yisroel (Task BGU)
- End-to-End Demonstration
  - End of FY Segment, November (Webinar)

# QUESTIONS



- Thank You